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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
P l a i n t i f f - r e s p o n d e n t a g r e e s t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d 
by t h e d e f e n d a n t - p e t i t i o n e r on a p p e a l a r e as s t a t e d in t h e 
P e t i t i o n fo r Wri t of C e r t i o r a r i , a l t h o u g h of c o u r s e 
p l a i n t i f f - r e s p o n d e n t f i n d s no e r r o r in t h e d e c i s i o n of t h e 
Cour t of A p p e a l s . 
OPINIONS BELOW 
The o p i n i o n of t h e Cour t of Appea l s i s a t t a c h e d as a 
p o r t i o n of t h e Appendix t o t h e P e t i t i o n fo r Wri t of 
C e r t i o r a r i . 
JURISDICTION 
This Cour t has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o c o n s i d e r t h e P e t i t i o n 
f o r Wri t of C e r t i o r a r i , bu t t h e Wri t shou ld be d e n i e d . 
AUTHORITIES INVOLVED 
P l a i n t i f f - r e s p o n d e n t a g r e e s w i t h d e f e n d a n t - p e t i t i o n e r ' s 
c i t a t i o n . The r e l e v a n t s t a t u t e i s a t t a c h e d as p a r t of t h e 
Appendix t o t h e P e t i t i o n fo r Wri t of C e r t i o r a r i . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This m a t t e r i s b e f o r e t h e Cour t f o l l o w i n g t h e 
a f f i r m a t i o n by t h e Cour t of Appea l s of t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s 
d e n i a l of d e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l a n t ' s Motion s e e k i n g t e r m i n a t i o n 
of payments t o p l a i n t i f f - r e s p o n d e n t under t h e Uniform 
Services Former Spouse Protection Act (10 U.S.C. Section 
1408). The appellant-husband requested that the trial court 
interpret the division of his retirement pay in the Decree 
as alimony. Plaintiff-respondent took the position that the 
division of appellant's military retirement pay was a 
division of property, not an award of alimony. The District 
Court concluded that the division of appellant's retirement 
pay in the Decree of Divorce had been a division of marital 
property and not an award of alimony, and denied appellant's 
request. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties were married in 1956, the same year 
defendant began his career in the United States Air Force. 
Two children were born of the marriage, one of whom is 
mentally handicapped and, at the time of the hearing from 
which this appeal arises, was still dependent upon parental 
support. Defendant subsequently retired from the U.S. Air 
Force in 1976, and began receiving his military retirement 
pension in approximately 1976. 
In May, 1983, respondent (hereinafter referred to as 
plaintiff) filed a Complaint for divorce through her 
previous attorney. Plaintiff and appellant (hereinafter 
referred to as defendant) executed a Stipulation and 
Agreement dated May 13th, 1983 (R., 4-8). The critipal part 
of that Stipulation for this appeal is contained in 
Paragraph 8 thereof, as follows: 
"Defendant agrees to pay, pursuant to 10 USC Section 
1408, of the Uniform Services Former Spouses Protection Act, 
one-half of USAF retired gross pay, one-half of which at 
present is $880-00, plus $490-00 alimony, plus $150.00 child 
support for Robert Jr. each per month. Said sums will be 
deposited to a bank account in the name of the plaintiff. 
The amount of alimony may be renegotiated annually, by 
agreement if possible, or by court order if agreement is not 
possible, and there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances. If Robert Jr. should become employed full 
time and/or become self supporting, child support payments 
shall cease. Defendant and plaintiff may be ordered to 
supply such financial records as necessary at the time or 
any renegotiations to substantiate any claims for adjustment 
of alimony or child support." 
On June 28, 1983 plaintiff appeared with her 
then-attorney, presented the Stipulation to the Court, and 
the Court ordered that the terms of the Divorce were to be 
as set forth in the Stipulation, with those terms to be 
incorporated into the Findings and Decree (R., 9). The 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law provided that the 
Decree should incorporate all matters stated in the 
Stipulation (R., 10 & 11), and a Decree of Divorce was 
entered on July 8, 1983 incorporating the terms of the 
Stipulation. Paragraph 8 of the Stipulation also appears, 
verbatim, as Paragraph 8 of the Decree (R., 15). 
In February 1984, defendant filed an Affidavit and 
obtained an Order to Show Cause seeking modification 
regarding some insurance policies, child support, and 
alimony (See Affidavit of Defendant, R., 17-19). 
Plaintiff filed a Response and Counter-Affidavit (R., 
21-25) seeking, among other things, to have her half of 
defendant's retirement pay paid to her directly from the Air 
Force. An Order was subsequently entered on February 28, 
1984 (R., 31-34). In that Order, the Trial Judge dealt with 
the retirement pay in Paragraph 10/ and dealt separately 
with the alimony in Paragraph 12. In the said Paragraph 12 
(R., 34), the Court refused to change the alimony, finding 
that the defendant remained able to "pay the full alimony 
ordered in the Decree of Divorce", stating that "the 
defendant shall continue to pay the sum of $490.00 per month 
alimony to the plaintiff". This Order was not appealed. 
Thereafter, in November 1985, defendant filed a Motion 
with the Court seeking termination of alimony "to include 
that portion being withheld from his retired pay", and 
further seeking termination of the requirement that 
defendant maintain the plaintiff as beneficiary under some 
life insurance policies. (R., 47-48). 
Plaintiff responded to the Motion, admitting her 
remarriage and admitting that alimony in the sum of $490.00 
per month should be terminated, although affirmatively 
alleging that defendant was at that time several thousand 
dollars behind in his alimony payments, and further pointing 
out that alimony and the division of defendant's military 
retirement pay had absolutely nothing to do with one 
another. (R., 51-52). 
Since the defendant had taken the liberty to submit an 
order to the Court terminating plaintiff's interest in 
defendant's military retirement pay, an Objection to that 
order and a Request for Hearing were also filed (R.,*53), 
and plaintiff also filed her Affidavit in Support of Order 
to Show Cause and Order to Show Cause (R., 57-61). 
Defendant's Motion and plaintiff's Order to Show Cause 
were consolidated for hearing, and the plaintiff filed a 
request that the Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen hear the 
matters since he had heard the original Decree of Divorce 
and the previous Order to Show Cause. (R., 60). 
The consolidated matters were heard on May 22, 1986, 
and a full transcript of that hearing is included with the 
record. At the hearing, both parties argued the matters 
before the Court, and although plaintiff offered to present 
testimony, the Court declined to hear any, stating as 
follows: 
"I think from what I've seen that I can go on what your 
documents and orders and prior pleadings and decree are.11 
(T., 33, lines 11-13). 
The parties and the Court had some further discussion 
concerning the Court deciding the matter on the record 
rather than taking testimony (T., 33-34), with the Court 
ultimately concluding that if he ran into a problem he felt 
was important enough then he would reopen the case and hear 
testimony (T., 34, lines 14-17). 
The Court entered a Memorandum Decision without 
requesting or hearing any testimony (R., 72-74), followed by 
an Order (R., 83-84), and Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (R., 85-90). 
The Order awarded judgment to the plaintiff for alimony 
arrearages calculated at the rate of $490.00 per month (R., 
77), ruled that the division of defendant's military 
retirement pay "has been and shall be considered as a 
division of property, and is not and was not alimony." (R., 
84). The Order further amended the Decree of Divorce to 
provide that plaintiff's share of defendant's military 
retirement pay should be one-half of his disposable or net 
retirement, instead of one-half of his gross retirement (R., 
84), in order to comply with the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 
Section 1408. 
Defendant appealed from those parts of the Order 
dealing with the military retirement pay. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. That Court held first 
that the language of the Decree and the Stipulation clearly 
supported the Trial Court's finding that the military 
retirement benefits were awarded in addition to alimony and 
child support and were awarded as marital property. 
Secondly, the Court held that the Trial Court's change 
in the Decree to provide that plaintiff receive one-half of 
defendant's net retirement benefits instead of his gross 
retirement benefits was simply the correction of a mistake 
and not an amendment or modification of the Decree 
necessitating a finding of a substantial change in 
circumstances. 
Thirdly, the Court held that military retirement 
benefits may be treated as marital property under Utah Law, 
holding that under Utah Law marital property encompasses all 
types of retirement funds. The Court, relying upon previous 
Supreme Court decisions, ruled that the critical issufe is 
whether or not the right to the benefit or asset accrued in 
whole or in part during the marriage. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY IS TREATED UNDER UTAH 
LAW IN THE SAME FASHION AS ALL OTHER TYPES OF 
RETIREMENT PAY. 
Utah law specifically provides for the equitable 
division of retirement pay, and military retirement pay 
should not be treated any differently. 
In the case of Woodward vs. Woodward, 656 P2d 431 
(Utah), this Court carefully and thoroughly considered the 
issue of retirement pay and how it should be treated in 
divorce actions under Utah law. In partially overruling the 
earlier case of Bennett vs. Bennett, 607 P2d 839 (Utah, 
1980), and upholding the Trial Court's award of a portion of 
the husband's retirement to the wife, the Court stated as 
follows: 
"The wife urges the adoption of the position taken by 
the California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Brown, 15 
Cal.3d 838, 544 P2d 561, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). There 
the Court held that "[p]ension rights, whether or not 
vested, represent a property interest; to the extent that 
such rights derive from employment during coverture, they 
comprise a community asset subject to division in a 
dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63, 126 Cal.Rptr. at 
634-35. This case overruled an earlier California case of 
long standing which had distinguished pension rights on the 
basis of whether the rights had vested. In the context of 
Utah law, we find it unnecessary to consider whether or not 
the pension rights are "vested or non-vested." In Enqlert 
vs. Enqlert, 576 P2d 1274 (Utah, 1978), we emphasized the 
equitable nature of proceedings dealing with the family, 
pointing out that the Court may take into consideration all 
of the pertinent circumstances. These circumstances 
encompass "all of the assets of every nature possessed by 
the parties, whenever obtained and from whatever source 
derived; and that this includes any such pension fund or 
insurance." (Woodward, Page 432). 
This Court continued, in referring to pension rights, 
as follows: 
"If the rights to those benefits are acquired during 
the marriage, then the Court must at least consider those 
benefits in making an equitable distribution of the material 
assets. 'The right to receive monies in the future is 
unquestionably...an economic resource1 subject to equitable 
distribution based upon proper computation of its present 
dollar value." (Citations omitted). Whether that resource 
is subject to distribution does not turn on whether the 
spouse can presently use or control it, or on whether the 
resource can be given a present dollar value. The essential 
criterion is whether a right to the benefit or asset has 
accrued in whole or in part during the marriage. To the 
extent that the right has so accrued it is subject to 
equitable distribution." (Woodward, Page 432-433). 
Defendant argues that this Court has never addressed 
the specific issue of whether or not military retirement pay 
is subject to division upon the dissolution of a marriage. 
It is respectfully submitted that the issue was decided in 
Woodward. 
As this Court stated in Woodward, Utah uses a very 
broad, equitable approach in proceedings dealing with the 
family and the division of assets in a divorce case. As 
noted above, this includes all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and from 
whatever source derived. 
Equity focuses upon the substance of a transaction 
rather than its form, as this Court did in the Woodward 
case. 
In the case of Linson vs. Linson, 618 P2d 748 (Hawaii), 
the Hawaii Appeals Court considered the issue of military 
retirement pensions. In ruling that a spouse's non-vested 
military retirement benefit constituted a part of the estate 
of the parties for purposes of division in a divorce 
proceeding, the Court considered and reviewed cases from 
several jurisdictions, some holding that they were. The 
Hawaii Court stated: 
"In reading the opinions of courts which have passed 
on this issue we come to the conclusion that those courts 
which hold that nonvested retirement benefits are cognizable 
or divisible do so on the basis of equity, although this is 
sometimes left unsaid. Courts holding that such benefits 
are not cognizable or divisible, on the other hand, appear 
not to have considered equity at all, but to have rather 
mechanically applied rules of property law." (Linson, P 
750-751). 
Defendant provides the Court with a lengthy discussion 
of a series of U. S. Supreme Court cases, culminating in the 
recent case of McCarty vs. McCarty. Defendant correctly 
states the holding and reasoning of the McCarty case, but 
incorrectly urges the Court to adopt it as current law. 
The McCarty case, and everything it stands for, was 
promptly rejected and overturned by Congress through the 
enactment of Title 10 U.S.C. Section 1408, commonly referred 
to as the Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act. 
A copy of this Act is attached to defendant's brief. In 
fact, Congress specifically made this act retroactive to the 
date of the McCarty decision (June 25, 1981) specifically to 
avoid the harsh and inequitable effect of the McCarty case 
upon divorced spouses of military personnel (Smith vs. 
Smith, 458 A2d 711 (Delaware 1983)). While it is true that 
each individual state may reach its own decision as to 
whether military retirement pay is a marital asset subject 
to being divided, it is difficult to see how this Court, in 
view of the Woodward decision, could equitably treat 
military retirement pay differently than any other type of 
retirement pay. 
Defendant argues to the Court that the "vast majority1 
of common law jurisdictions continue to follow the 
principles enunciated in the McCarty case, holding that 
military retirement pay is not subject to division in a 
divorce action. In support of this contention defendant 
cites several cases decided prior to the enactment of the 
Uniformed Services Former Spouse Protection Act. At this 
time state courts did not have the option of deciding 
whether military retirement pensions could be divided, 
because several cases prior to the McCarty case had been 
fairly consistent in holding that the states could not 
interfere with military retirement pensions. 
The following jurisdictions have held that military 
retirement pay is property subject to division in a divorce 
proceeding: Alaska - Chase vs. Chase (Supra); Arizona -
Czarnecki vs. Czarnecki, 600 P2d 1098 (1979); California -
In re Marriage of Stenguist, 582 P2d 96 (1978); Hawaii -
Linson vs. Linson, 618 P2d 748 (1980); Idaho - Lang vs. 
Lang, 711 P2d 1322 (1985); Montana - In re Marriage of 
Kecskes, 683, P2d 478 (1984); New Mexico - Waltenkowski vs. 
Waltonkowski, 672 P2d 657 (1983); Oregon - Matter of 
Marriage of Wood, 676 P2d 338 (1984); Washington - In re 
Marriage of Landry, 699 P2d 214 (1985); New Jersey -
Castiglioni vs. Castiglioni, 471 A2d 809 (1984); Iowa - In 
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re Marriage of Schissel, 292, NW2d 421 (1980); Missouri -
Coates vs. Coates, 650 SW2d 307 (1983); Texas - Voronin vs. 
Vorornn, 662 SW2d 102 (1983); Illinois - re Marriage of 
Dooley, 484 NE2d 894 (1985); Louisiana - Allen vs. Allen, 
484 So2d 269 (1986) . 
In summary, there is no logical reason to treat 
military retirement pay any differently than any other type 
of retirement pay. Utah uses an eguitable approach in 
divorce proceedings, and there certainly is no eguitable 
reason for military retirement pay to be handled 
differently. At one time, there was indeed a legal reason, 
to wit, the McCarty case and its predecessors. Under those 
cases, states were forbidden from dividing military 
retirement pay. However, the McCarty case was guickly, 
thoroughly and soundly overruled by Congress and there is no 
longer any legal reason for treating military pay 
differently. 
Defendant's argument that all distinctions between 
income and marital property would be lost if military 
retirement pay is to be classified as "property" was 
rejected by this very Court in Woodward. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its position 
concerning retirement funds, in the case of Gardner vs. 
Gardner, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 35 (Utah, 1988). In that case, 
the District Court had awarded the husband his eritire 
retirement account without placing a present value on those 
-11-
assets, referring to the retirement account as "futuristic". 
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further 
consideration and findings, stating as follows: 
"In Woodward vs. Woodward, 656 P2d 432, we recognized 
that retirement benefits, whether vested or not, are a form 
of deferred compensation which a Court should at least 
consider when dividing marital assets. A right to deferred 
compensation acquired during marriage or that portion of 
one's right to deferred compensation acquired during 
marriage, should not be entirely ignored when dividing 
assets, irrespective of when the vested funds are payable. 
Thus, marital property fencompasses all of the assets of 
every nature possessed by the parties, whenever obtained and 
from whatever source derived1 and this includes any such 
pension fund or insurance" (quotations in original, quoting 
from Enqlert vs. Enqlert, 576 P2d 1274 (Utah 1978). 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT MODIFY THE DECREE TO CLASSIFY 
DEFENDANT'S MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY AS MARITAL 
PROPERTY AND THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION. 
Defendant argues to the Court that the Court modified 
the Decree of Divorce to classify the defendant's income as 
marital property. 
A cursory examination of the record shows that this is 
not what happened in the lower court. 
The parties entered into a Stipulation (R., 4-8) which 
in turn was incorporated into the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law (R., 10-11), and the Decree of Divorce 
(R., 12-15). No appeal was taken from the Decree. 
Thereafter, in February 1984, defendant initiated a 
hearing on an Order to Show Cause in an attempt to lower or 
terminate the alimony he was paying to the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff responded, a hearing was held, and an order was 
entered (R., 31-34). As is evident from the record, that 
entire proceeding occurred with no mention of defendant's 
new-found theory that the division of his retirement pay was 
alimony, not property• In fact, it is clear from the order 
entered in that February 1984 proceeding that alimony was 
considered to be $490.00 per month, child support was 
considered to be $150.00 per month, leaving the division of 
retirement pay as property. 
The record reflects substantial communication between 
the parties and their attorneys thereafter (R., 35-44), 
including two separate stipulations, neither of which deal 
in any way with the issue of retirement pay. 
In November 1985, for the first time, defendant raised 
the issue of his retirement pay, by filing a motion seeking 
the termination of alimony, "to include that portion being 
withheld from his retirement pay". (R., 47). Other matters 
were raised in that motion and in plaintiff's response, none 
of which are appealed. 
The Trial Court was called upon to interpret its 
Decree, not modify the same. Neither party requested nor 
presented evidence in support of modification regarding the 
issue of retirement pay. 
It should be noted at this juncture that if this Court 
feels that defendant's motion could or should be interpreted 
as a request for modification, then the defendant failed to 
prove the necessary compelling reasons to modify as required 
by this Court in Foulger vs. Foulger, 626 P2d 412 (Utah, 
1981), which is quoted by the defendant in his brief. Also, 
see Land vs. Land, 605 P2d 1248 (Utah, 1980), and Despain 
vs. Despain, 610 P2d 1303 (Utah, 1980), both quoted and 
referred to in defendant's brief. If defendant's motion is 
so interpreted, then defendant failed in his proof, did not 
meet the appropriate standard, and his application should be 
denied. 
On the other hand, from the record it would appear that 
the parties and the Trial Court viewed the issue of 
retirement pay as one of interpreting the decree. Following 
that theory, the Trial Court heard argument from the 
parties, but did not invite or accept any testimony or new 
evidence, stating that the matter could be decided from the 
Stipulation, Decree, and on the record itself (T., 33-34). 
As this Court has stated many times, the standard of 
review in divorce proceedings is that this Court will not 
disturb a Trial Court's findings and orders absent an abuse 
of discretion. See Wiese vs. Wiose, 699 P2d 700 (Utah, 
1985; Fletcher vs. Fletcher, 615 P2d 1218 (Utah, 1980); Lord 
vs. Shaw, 682 P2d 853 (Utah, 1984) - (absent an abuse of 
discretion, the Supreme Court will not substitute its 
judgment for that of the Trial Court.) 
The situation presented to this Court is one of a Trial 
Court interpreting its own Decree, and finding that the 
initial Decree had divided defendant's military retirement 
pay as property. Given the advantaged position of the Trial 
Court and the standard applied to such matters (noted above) 
this Court should not overturn the Trial Judge's 
interpretati on. 
The only amendment the Court made to the Decree was to 
change the division between the parties from one-half of 
gross to one-half of net. As was pointed out in the 
argument of both parties at the hearing (T., 20-22), the 
award in the Decree of one-half of the gross retired pay 
exceeded the amount allowed by Congress in 10 U.S.C. 1408. 
Both parties agreed that the Decree should read "net" rather 
than "gross" (T., 20, lines 6-7). 
In addition, the parties at the hearing in effect 
stipulated to the amendment changing "gross" to "net". On 
Pages 34, 35, and 36 of the transcript, the parties and the 
Court enter into a discussion concerning how to calculate 
the alimony arrearage. The discussion centered around 
whether or not Mr. Greene had overpaid plaintiff her portion 
of his pension during a time period when he was still 
receiving a full pension and then turning half of it over to 
her. Defendant's attorney indicated that the parties could 
"stipulate to what those figures are once we get his (the 
Court's) ruling. You have the numbers and I do. We should 
be able to work it out. We don't know what they are." (T., 
34-35). 
Also see page 35 of the transcript, lines 4 through 10 
and Page 36 of the transcript, lines 12-25. 
Thus, there was an agreement between the parties to 
modify the Decree so that the division of defendant's 
retirement pay was based upon his net retirement pay rather 
than his gross retirement pay. 
During the hearing, it became apparent to the Court and 
all parties that it was necessary to amend or modify the 
Decree to provide for a division of the retirement pay on a 
net basis rather than a gross basis. The Court modified the 
Decree accordingly. Although the Court did not specifically 
make any findings or statement concerning the basis of its 
authority to do so, it is apparent that the Court may modify 
its own Decree. In addition, Section 30-4a-l of the Utah 
Code provides that the Court may enter nunc pro tunc orders 
in divorce cases. Although the Court in this case did not 
base its modification or change upon this statutory 
authority, it is respectfully submitted that the Court could 
have done so. 
Also, Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides for correcting or altering judgments for various 
reasons. Subdivision 5 of that rule provides that a final 
judgment may be altered if the judgment is void, while 
Subdivision 7 provides that a final judgment may be altered 
for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. 
Although this particular section was not invoked by the 
Court or any of the parties in the proceeding below, it 
would appear that the portion of the judgment granting 
one-half of the defendant's gross pay to plaintiff was 
either void or beyond the jurisdiction of the Court, and 
could be corrected pursuant to Subdivision 5 or Subdivision 
7 of Rule 60(b) to read net pay. 
In his brief, defendant argues that the Stipulation 
should be construed strictly against the plaintiff, since 
the attorney representing her prepared the Stipulation and 
presented it to the Court. This same argument was presented 
by the defendant at the hearing. While that type of 
reasoning may be accurate when parties are litigating a 
contract, it is not applicable in this case. The parties 
here are asking the Court to interpret a Decree of Divorce, 
not a stipulation. The Decree was entered by the Court, and 
the Court certainly has the authority to interpret it when 
presented directly with the issue. 
Defendant further argues that "plaintiff must not be 
permitted to obtain a property interest in defendant's 
military retired pay three (3) years after she relinquished 
all such interest." (Appellant's brief, page 25.) 
Plaintiff made no such relinquishment, and it is clear that 
the Court interpreted the Decree, and made no amendment 
granting the plaintiff a property interest. The only 
amendment made was to correct an obvious error, to wit, the 
granting of one-half the gross pay rather than one-half of 
the net. 
CONCLUSION 
The law of Utah is well settled and the District Court 
and the Court of Appeals both properly concluded that 
defendant's military retirement pay is subject to division 
between the parties as property accumulated during the 
marriage• 
The Decree was amended to correct a mistake, and no 
finding of changed circumstances was necessary. In any 
event, the parties stipulated to the amendment. 
DATED this day of 1988. 
Respectful ly submitted, 
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